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The purpose of doctrine is to unite beliefs and actions. The Armed Forces are not 
always successful in achieving true interoperability; one cause for the disconnection 
between them is that, while the Services develop forces, they do not employ them. The 
Combatant commands employ what the Services provide. Accordingly, one of doctrine's 
most valuable roles is assuring the integration of the developer and operator. This thesis 
examines the successfulness of Naval and Joint Warfare and Command and Control 
doctrine at the interface of development and employment. 
The thesis concludes that Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed 
Forces, and Joint Publication 6, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and 
Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations, present an integrated, focused 
framework. The ties to (and between) the corresponding Naval Doctrine Publications are 
weaker. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, the Naval Doctrine Command's 
first attempt at issuing doctrine, contains several weaknesses that detract from its stated 
purpose of establishing a framework for more detailed doctrine. Naval Doctrine 
Publication 6, Naval Command and Control, does meet its purpose and is a much 
stronger document, but could be further strengthened by incorporating a discussion of 
how Naval Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence systems 
will be employed to support Naval Command and Control. 
v 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since 1993, the Naval Doctrine Command has been writing and issuing doctrine 
for the naval forces 1• It is time to review the initial publications and assess their 
effectiveness. This thesis examines the successfulness of Naval and Joint Warfare and 
Command and Control doctrine at the interface of development and employment. Issues 
addressed are: 
• Is the doctrine reflected in NDP 1 (Naval Waifare) and NDP 6 (Naval 
Command and Control) effective? 
• Does NDP 1 logically flow from higher sources, such as the National Military 
Strategy and Joint Pub 1? 
• Does NDP 6logically flow from higher sources, such as the National Military 
Strategy, Joint Pub 1, Joint Pub 6, and support NDP 1? 
In order to answer the questions posed above, Chapter II defines doctrine. It 
discusses what doctrine is, and equally importantly, what it is not. This includes.some 
basic distinctions between doctrine, vision, principle, philosophy, and strategy. It 
provides a list of criteria shared by powerful doctrine and reviews four levels of doctrine. 
Based on the preceding discussion, standards can be distilled to measure the usefulness of 
doctrine. Further, because the future of warfare will certainly involve joint operations, 
Chapter II briefly reviews the basic doctrine of the remaining Services. 
1 Throughout this thesis, "naval forces" refers to both the Navy and Marine Corps, as well as the Coast Guard when 
operating as an arm of the Navy. · 
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The Armed Forces are not always successful in achieving true interoperability. 
One cause for the disconnection between them is that, while the Services develop forces, 
they do not employ them. The Combatant commands employ what the Services provide. 
Accordingly, one of doctrine's most valuable roles is assuring the integration of the 
developer and operator. Doctrine is easier to define than establish. It is not tangible; it is 
conceptual. The complexities of establishing it are further complicated by the fact that in 
the U.S. Armed Forces, the Services are required by law to organize, train, and equip the 
forces for war, but the conduct of war is vested in the combatant commanders-in-chief 
(CINCs). Integration of force development and employment is not an easy task. Because 
of their roles and functions, the Services have a better understanding of their own 
capabilities and are in the best position to write doctrine on how to employ the forces they 
develop. At the same time, the Unified CINCs retain the corporate knowledge in 
warfighting and operations. Establishing Service doctrine thus requires close 
coordination between the Services and the CINCs to ensure that doctrine both ably 
reflects Service capabilities and supports the CINCs requirements. Chapter m discusses 
these challenges and shows how these affect establishment of doctrine. 
Chapter IV analyzes current doctrine, having defined doctrine, developed 
standards, and discussed some of the principle challenges facing doctrine developers, it is 
possible to relate the challenges to current doctrine. It looks specifically at Joint Pubs 1 
and 6, and NDPs 1 and 6. It also provides a brief overview of the basic doctrine 
publications for the Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force. 
X 
The thesis concludes that Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed 
Forces, and Joint Publication 6, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and 
Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations, present an integrated, focused 
framework. The ties to (and between) the corresponding Naval Doctrine Publications are 
weaker. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, the Naval Doctrine Command's 
first attempt at issuing doctrine, contains several weaknesses that detract from its stated 
purpose of establishing a framework for more detailed doctrine. Naval Doctrine 
Publication 6, Naval Command and Control, does meet its purpose and is a much 
stronger document, but could be further strengthened by incorporating a discussion of 
how Naval Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence systems 




One of the purposes of doctrine is to unite beliefs and actions. However, the 
Armed Forces are not always successful in achieving true interoperability. One cause for 
the disconnection between them is that, while the Services develop forces, they do not 
employ them. The Combatant commands employ what the Services provide. 
Accordingly, one of doctrine's most valuable roles is assuring the integration of the . 
developer and operator. 
Speaking of the tactical level, Hughes says that, 
Doctrine is the companion and instrument of good leadership. It is the 
basis of training and all that that implies: cohesion, reliability in battle, and 
mutual understanding and support. (Hughes, 1986, p.24) 
He goes on to point out that "Nelson understood as well as any man that doctrine is the 
glue of good tactics." (Hughes, 1986, p.24) Despite the common perception that Nelson 
departed from doctrine (Royal Navy's Fighting Instructions) to become a successful 
commander, Nelson actually spent a great deal of time communicating with his captains 
about what he wanted -- and then practicing it. The reason he was so successful is that he 
and his captains understood each other exceptionally well; actual battle did not need extra 
communications. 
1 
Since 1993, the Naval Doctrine Command has been writing and issuing doctrine 
for the naval forces2• It is time to review the initial publications and assess their 
effectiveness. 
This thesis takes the position that the purpose of doctrine is to unite beliefs and 
actions; good doctrine is crucial in achieving unity of effort at every level. Specifically, it 
examines the successfulness of Naval and Joint Warfare and Command and Control 
doctrine at the interface of force development and employment. Issues addressed are: 
• Is the doctrine reflected in NDP 1 (Naval Waifare) and NDP 6 (Naval 
Command and Control) effective? 
• Does NDP 1logically flow from higher sources, such as the National Military 
Strategy and Joint Pub 1? 
• Does NDP 6 logically flow from higher sources, such as the National Military 
Strategy, Joint Pub 1, and Joint Pub 6, and does it support NDP 1? 
The relationship between Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
Intelligence (C41) and doctrine may not be obvious. Doctrine is a function of command. 
As defined by the Department of Defense, command is 
the authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises 
over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the 
authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and 
for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and 
controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. 
(NDP 1, 1994, p. 7) 
2 Throughout this thesis, "naval forces" refers to both the Navy and Marine Corps, as well as the Coast Guard when 
operating as an arm of the Navy. 
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When a commander issues doctrine, he is meeting part of his responsibility to 
direct, coordinate, and control military forces under his command . 
. B. SCOPE 
In order to answer the questions posed above, it is necessary to define doctrine, 
discuss qualities that characterize powerful (good) doctrine, and develop some standards 
with which to analyze NDP 1 and NDP 6. Further, because the future of warfare will 




II. DEFINING DOCTRINE 
A. DOCTRINE DEFINED 
There is not yet a strong doctrinal culture or structure in the U.S. Navy. This is 
unfortunate, because doctrine is relevant to today's Navy-- as well as the other armed 
Services. Further, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has dictated that the Services 
will develop doctrine and it will be followed. The Navy has been slower than some of the 
other Armed Forces in appreciating the value of formal doctrine, although the issue was 
addressed at least as early as 1915. In fact, some ofthe attitudes of 1915 remain 
prevalent: 
... we are prone to regard doctrine as being evanescent and purely academic 
-- a matter of interest only from a theoretical standpoint. In so doing, we 
eliminate from our services one of the most important elements of military 
command and a potent aid to victory. (Knox, 1915, p.348) 
Although increasingly more individuals are beginning to acknowledge the utility 
of doctrine, the institutional attitude appears ambivalent. This is, in part, due to a long 
tradition ofthe U.S. Navy in operating with scarce attention to its formal (written) 
doctrine3. 
Doctrine means different things to different people. We need to establish a 
baseline, but this is difficult. The dictionary defines doctrine as 
3 It should be noted, however, that written doctrine h~s in fact existed in the form of numerous Naval Warfare 
Publications and T ACMEMOs. 
5 
1 archaic : TEACHING, INSTRUCTION 2 a: something that is taught 
b: principle or position or the body of principles in a branch of knowledge 
or system of belief : DOGMA c: a principle of law established through 
past decisions d: a statement of fundamental government policy esp. in 
international relations. (Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 1993, 
p. 342) 
The Department of Defense echoes this, by defining doctrine as a collection of 
... fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof 
guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative by 
requiring judgment in application. (NDP 1, 1994, 50) 
Yet even this is vague and open to multiple interpretations. The current 
Commander of the Naval Doctrine Command noted this problem and provided an 
informal definition. His personal working definition is that doctrine is a "dialogue of 
who we are, what we do, and how we do it." 4 (Bowman, 1996) 
Perhaps a better way to understand doctrine is to describe what it can do, rather 
than define it. Hughes and Knox have both written eloquently on the topic of doctrine. 
The following subsections review their basic points. 
1. What Doctrine Is 
Doctrine flows from general principles; in the case of military doctrine, this is 
national strategy and higher level doctrine. Knox and others assert that doctrine should 
be developed top down, that is, 
The big questions of doctrine should first be settled as well as those of 
command, strategy, tactics, logistics and materiel. Then from such basic 
decisions minor doctrines may be reasoned to flow logically and 
consistently so that all parts of the grand scheme will be consistent and 
harmonious. (Knox, 1915, p. 347) 
4 RADM Bowman noted that even among his staff, the number of definitions of "doctrine" was directly related to the 
number of people in the room at the time. 
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This provides a foundation upon which subordinate doctrine and tactics can be structured. 
In addition, it allows doctrine to be fully integrated and cohesive. This is essential to 
ensure subordinate level doctrine supports higher level doctrine and does not contradict 
other doctrine at the same level. Doctrine promotes cohesion, the bonding of fighters in 
a force. Most U.S. doctrine emphasizes Structural Cohesion (that of organization and 
beliefs), based on shared common beliefs, equipment, and organization. Speaking as part 
of the Superintendent's Guest Lecture series at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Major General Silvasy, former J7 for the Joint Chiefs of Staff5, noted that cohesion is 
brought about by the common values shared by all American military members and 
history of successful joint operations. Those common values shape, and are shaped by, 
common doctrine. 
Doctrine unites action, and is therefore a source of power. This is a critical 
purpose of doctrine, since united action gives combat power. Doctrine's power comes 
about through its ability to create coherence and unite activities. Equally importantly, 
doctrine is what people believe in and do. Although defined by the issuing authority, 
doctrine must be internalized by both the organization and its individuals. If they do not, 
the doctrine will have no power. 
Doctrine provides training baselines and standards to measure against. 
Doctrine is reflected in teaching. Doctrine is a standard operating procedure, from 
which an innovative commander "knowingly departs to exploit an opportunity, fully 
confident that his fellows will act in a predictable way; indeed in the best of worlds with 
5 J7 considers itself the "architect for the future." Included in this directorate are Joint Doctrine, Joint Military 
Education, Joint War Plans, and the Joint Warfighting Center. 
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the best of captains, even the departures seem predictable in the circumstances." (Hughes, 
1986, p. 31) Doctrine incorporates an organization's beliefs and "how to's." This is 
particularly true at the tactical level. 
2. What Doctrine Is Not 
Doctrine is not a vision. Visions describe the future -- where we want to go. 
Doctrine deals with the present, translating the vision and principles to action and 
providing guidance on how to use principles to operate. Thi.s is not to say that vision is 
unimportant. It lays the groundwork for doctrine of the future; a commonly cited 
example is the development of the Marine Corps amphibious assault doctrine. It 
ultimately led to the development of amphibious ships and landing teams. 
Neither is doctrine a timeless truth or a constant; it is not carved in stone. It can --
and must -- be changed to meet the needs of the organization it serves. Doctrine can 
quickly tum to rigid dogma, weakening its impact. To overcome this risk, doctrine 
should be considered authoritative guidance. This avoids rigidity and permits 
ingenuity. 
Doctrine is not a philosophy, policy, or strategy, although they are all related. 
Philosophy is defined as "a theory underlying or regarding a sphere of activity or 
thought" as well as "the most general beliefs, concepts, and attitudes of an individual or 
group." (Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 1993, p. 873) Principles are 
8 
fundamental assumptions; policy is a "high-level overall plan embracing the general 
goals and acceptable procedures .... " (Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 1993, p. 
901). 
Distinguishing between strategy and doctrine, Draft AFDD-1 says: 
Strategy originates in policy and addresses broad objectives and the plans 
for achieving them. Doctrine originates in the inherent capabilities of a 
particular type of military power (land, naval, air or space) and addresses 
how best to use that type of power, but in practice, political, economic, or 
social realities may dictate strategic and operational approaches that 
violate some aspect of doctrine .... Because war is "an instrument of 
policy," the first rule of doctrine always is that policy governs the 
employment of military power. In other words, there should be a clearly 
established link between national security strategy, related national 
military strategy, theater military strategy and objectives, and the specific 
force capabilities necessary to support those objectives. (Draft AFDD I, 
1996, p. C-2) 
B. WHAT MAKES POWERFUL DOCTRINE? 
Having discussed what doctrine is, it is important to discuss what makes doctrine 
useful. To be useful, it must be powerful. In Fleet Tactics and an article written for 
Naval Proceedings ("The Power in Doctrine"), Hughes maintains that powerful doctrine 
shares the following criteria. 
• It is flexible, not only in application, but in meeting the changed needs of the 
organization over time. It can be adapted to meet new requirements. 
• It allows initiative. Although doctrine is authoritative guidance, it must leave 
room for users to deviate from it when necessary. 
• It is easily understood and accomplished. 
• It is simple, clear, and concise. 
• It retains control, essential to united action. 
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• It is compatible with other doctrine at similar levels, that is, it is part of a 
cohesive, comprehensive whole. It must logically flow from (and support) 
higher level doctrine and set the stage for lower level doctrine. 
• Doctrine provides authoritative guidance, rather than being rigidly 
prescriptive. 
C. UTILITY OF DOCTRINE 
It is not the intent of this thesis to make a case for or against current doctrine. 
However, a review of the need for doctrine is warranted. Good doctrine, well-practiced, 
leads to simpler (and shorter) orders that are more readily understood. People already 
understand what is expected of them. This is particularly critical within each of the 
Armed Forces. Outwardly stable, the forces are fraught with transfers of personnel, task 
forces, and individual units within and between fleets and areas of operations. 
The more unstable the force composition, the greater the need for 
standardized tactics and commands. Likewise, the greater the rate of 
turnover of tactical commanders and COs, the greater the need for 
personal consultation in planning and for tactical simplicity, although 
these cannot substitute for a unit's stability and cohesion. (Hughes, 1986, 
p. 273) 
This problem is compounded during joint operations, when personnel from different 
Services bring with them their own Service's proclivities and procedures. 
For effective control, it may be necessary to subdivide forces into smaller units, 
each with its own leader -- thus establishing a chain of command to carry out the 
commander's wishes. As Knox pointed out, this chain merely provides the framework 
for command and control. Although the commander issues instructions, these do not --
cannot-- meet every contingency (and the more contingencies they cover, the more 
10 
complicated they get). In the heat of battle, the instructions get forgotten or are overcome 
by events. Leaders must be able to anticipate the intent and wishes of higher authority 
and act of their own initiative to accomplish these. Although a commander can 
promulgate his intent, he cannot know everything that happens when it happens. If he 
tries to control all things, he may make bad decisions because information will be 
delayed; warfare requires immediate actions. Although C41 systems can help reduce 
transmission delays, they cannot write the commander's thoughts, nor can they read his 
thoughts at the receiving end. 
While discipline can help ensure the commander's intent and instruction are 
followed and a good organization can ensure that they get transmitted in a timely manner, 
doctrine helps ensure that the spirit behind the intent is carried out. If well-exercised 
prior to the breakout of hostilities or crises, it develops a common bond and mutual 
understanding between all members of the organization while the commander and his 
team has time to do so. 
Knox pointed out that doctrine flows from principles and offered the German and 
French Army doctrine (as of 1915) as examples, both based on studies of the "Napoleonic 
methods of conducting war, so that both flow not only from the same principles but also 
from the methods of one man." (Knox, 1915, pp. 334-335) Although based on the same 
war, the doctrines were radically different, " ... due to the differences in the relative values 
of the several principles involved, likely to be assigned by different students, as well as to 
individual variations in the manner of applying the various principles to specific 
conditions." (Knox, 1915, p. 335) 
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If different values are applied to the same principles within the same fleet or army 
(or even nation), chaos may ensue and the results can be fatal. On the other hand, 
common doctrine results in harmony, with the united action essential to combat power. 
1. Levels of Doctrine 
Doctrine is layered depending on the echelon it serves, as summarized in Table 1. 
(Hughes, 1995,pp. 17-18) 
• National Military Strategy is the national level. It deals with core beliefs 
rather than specific actions. Hughes sees its value as "promise to the troops." 
It is essentially Basic Doctrine, that is, it describes the heart of the organization 
and serves as a foundation to build upon. 
• Campaigns and Operational Art is practiced at the CINC level. It transforms 
the beliefs of echelon 1 into modes of action. Its value is in careful wording, 
rather than in imposing demands. 
• Fleet Tactics describes doctrine found at the task force level; it deals with a set 
of tactical choices. Its value is in practiced, coordinated fighting with combat 
arms. 
• Single Unit Tactics, Techniques and Procedures are found at the ship, 
aircraft, and combat team level. It is preplanned, practiced~ and exercised 
activity. Its value is in "spontaneous" teamwork; belief is almost irrelevant. 
Doctrine is most detailed and less flexible at this level. 
12 
ECHELON LEVEL DOCTRINE VALUE 
1 National Military Core beliefs. Promise to the troops. 
Strategy 
2 Campaigns and Modes of action. Careful wording. 
Operational Art. 
3 Fleet Tactics Tactical practices. Practiced, coordinated 
fighting with 
combined arms 
4 Single Unit TTP Preplanned, practiced, Spontaneous 
exercised activity. teamwork. 
Table 1. Levels of Doctrine 
To be useful, doctrine must be balanced to meet the needs of the echelon it serves. 
Hughes offers three criteria to consider (Hughes, 1995, p. 18). 
• Is the doctrine action or beliefs? 
• Is it obligatory or guidance? 
• Is it contemporary or timeless (duration)? 
The answers - or emphasis - depends on which echelon the doctrine is to serve. Figure 1 
shows the poles of a scale balancing level 1 and level 4 doctrine. 
LEVEL 1. LEVEL4 
(NATIONAL) (UNIT) 
Belief 




Figure 1. Balancing Doctrine 
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2. Standards 
Based on earlier discussions, it is possible to distill some basic standards for 
measuring the usefulness of doctrine. 
• Compatibility. Does the doctrine flow from higher principles? Is it 
compatible with other doctrine at similar levels? Does it flow logically from 
higher and to lower levels? 
• Commonality. Does it unite action and promote a cohesive force? Does it 
offer a common perspective? 
• Beliefs. Is it what people believe in and act on? 
• Training. Does it provide a training baseline and standard? 
• Guidance. Is it authoritative and firm? 
• Adaptability. Is the doctrine adaptable to the whole range of scenarios 
possible at its level? 
• Initiative. Does it allow initiative on the commander's part? 
• Control. Does it allow the commander to retain control? 
• Appropriateness. Is the doctrine appropriate for the level supported? 
• Language. Is it simple, clear, and concise? 
• Ease of use. Is it easily understood and accomplished? 
These standards will be used in Chapter IV to help analyze NDP 1 and NDP 6. 
D. THE SERVICES' POSITIONS ON DOCTRINE 
The Joint Staff and the Services have similar views regarding doctrine, although 
there are some slight differences. The basic doctrine publications are considered either 
14 
capstone documents or keystone documents. A capstone is " ... a coping stone ... the high 
point: crowning achievement." (Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 1993, p. 170) 
A keystone is " ... the wedge-shaped piece at the crown of an arch that locks the other 
pieces in place [or] ... something on which associated things depend for support." 
(Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 1993, p. 641) 
1. The Joint View 
As described in Joint Pub 1, military doctrine 
Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the 
employment of forces. Doctrine is authoritative but not directive. It 
provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective 
experience with warfare. However, doctrine cannot replace clear thinking 
or alter a commander's obligation to determine the proper course of action 
under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision .... Though 
neither policy nor strategy,joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue 
of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic 
ends. (Joint Pub 1, 1991, p. 5) 
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the following guidance to J7 
regarding joint doctrine (Silvasy, 1996); it is equally valid as a general definition of 
military doctrine. There are four main points. Doctrine must: 
• define the way we will train and fight or operate. 
• be authoritative and universally practiced -- it is sufficiently prescriptive. 
• be authored by senior leadership and the best and brightest, operationally 
proficient action officers. 
• be easily understood and taught and used by operational commanders. 
To help explain the role of doctrine, J7 uses this analogy: doctrine is the playbook 
by which the joint team develops the game plan and practices. Commanders can call 
15 
audible signals at the line of scrimmage if necessary. The major challenge for joint 
doctrine is translating it into operationally sound and executable joint tactics, techniques, 
and procedures. 
Joint Pubs 1 through 6 are considered keystone documents. 
2. Naval Forces 
Doctrine is considered authoritative guidance. NDP 1 characterizes doctrine as 
... the starting point from which we develop solutions and options to 
address specific warfighting demands and challenges we face in 
conducting operations. Doctrine is conceptual - a shared way of thinking 
that is not directive. To be useful, doctrine must be known and 
understood. With doctrine, we gain standardization, without relinquishing 
freedom of judgment and the commander's need to exercise initiative in 
battle .... Doctrine guides our actions toward well defined goals and 
provides the basis for mu,tual understanding within and among the 
Services and the national policy makers. (NDP 1, 1994, p. ii) 
NDPs 1 through 6 are considered capstone documents, developed together by the 
Navy and Marine Corps, however, the Marine Corps may also develop a parallel set of 
doctrine. The Marine Corps view of doctrine follows. 
Doctrine is a teaching advanced as the fundamental beliefs of the Marine 
Corps on the subject of war, from nature and theory to its preparation and 
conduct. Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a 
way of fighting, a philosophy for leading Marines in combat, a mandate 
for professionalism, and a common language. In short, it establishes the 
way we practice our profession. In this manner, doctrine provides the 
basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding .... Our doctrine 
does not consist of procedures to be followed in specific situations so 
much as it establishes general guidance that requires judgment in 
application. Therefore, while authoritative, doctrine is not prescriptive. 
(FMFM 1, 1989 p. 43) 
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3. U.S. Army 
The Army has a well-established - if hard won - tradition of strong formal 
doctrine. It considers doctrine to be an " ... authoritative statement, ... definitive enough to 
guide specific operations, yet...adaptable enough to address diverse and varied situations 
worldwide." (FM 100-5, 1993, Chapter 1) 
4. U.S. Air Force 
Air and space doctrine has grown from the need to establish common 
guidelines for military action. These guidelines are particularly important 
under the stress of combat. (Draft AFDD 1, 1996, p. C-1) 
The Air Force has identified three levels of doctrine. Basic doctrine is roughly 
analogous to Hughes' Levell Doctrine. It is 
... the most fundamental and enduring beliefs which describe and guide the 
proper use of air and space forces in military action. Basic doctrine is the 
foundation of all air and space doctrine. Because of its fundamental and 
enduring character, basic doctrine provides broad and continuing guidance 
on how Air Force forces are prepared and employed. (Draft AFDD 1, 
1996, p. C-1) 
Operational doctrine is similar to Hughes' Level 2/3. It " ... applies the principles of 
basic doctrine to military actions by describing the proper use of air and space forces in 
the context of distinct objectives, force capabilities, broad mission areas, and operational 
environments." (Draft AFDD 1, 1996, p. C-1) It, along with basic doctrine, establishes 
the framework for tactical doctrine which " ... considers particular tactical objectives 
(blockading a harbor with aerial mines) and tactical conditions (threats, weather, and 
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terrain) and describes how a specific weapon system is employed to accomplish the 
tactical objective (B-1 s laying mines at low altitude)." (Draft AFDD-1, 1996, pp. C-1-
C-2) This can be regarded as Hughes' Level3/4. 
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III. CHALLENGES IN ESTABLISHING DOCTRINE 
As challenging as doctrine is to define, it is still easier to define than to establish. 
It is not tangible; it is conceptual. The complexities of establishing it are further 
complicated by the fact that in the U.S. Armed Forces, the Services are required by law to 
organize, train, and equip the forces for war, but the conduct of war is vested in the 
combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs). The Services develop the forces; the CINCs 
employ them. Because most U.S. operations are joint operations, it is important to 
recognize the challenges presented by the division of force development and employment. 
A. DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
In order to ensure compatibility between Service doctrine, and between Service 
doctrine and joint doctrine, developers must take into account the differences between 
roles, missions, and functions. 
• Roles derive from the National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10 USC. They 
are the core warfare function of each Service (air, land, sea). 
• Missions derive from the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. 
The combatant commanders (CINCs) are specifically tasked with the "job of 
carrying out broad operational missions" and the Services "become in effect 
force providers for CINCs." (Kuehl and Miller, 1994, p. 103) The CINCs 
employ the forces developed by the Services. 
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• Functions are based on Executive Order No. 9877 (26 July 1947), "Functions 
of the Armed Forces," and have a legal basis in DOD Directive 5100.1. This 
includes the activities the Services are responsible for: developing the force 
through organizing, training, and equipping. The Key West Agreement of 
1948 further clarified the roles laid out in the National Security Act, as well as 
better defining the specific Service functions addressed in the Executive Order. 
It also distinguished between primary and collateral functions. Functions often 
overlap between Services. 
This presents some unique challenges to developers of doctrine. Congress assigns 
roles and missions, the Executive Branch assigns functions. The CINCs employ the 
forces to carry out the CINCs' assigned missions. This creates a difficult interface, as 
commanders are faced with two different chains of command: an administrative chairi 
through a military department (functions) and an operational chain through the 
combatant commanders to the National Command Authority (missions). 
To recapitulate: services develop forces but do not employ them, while 
combatant commands, under joint doctrine, employ forces but do not 
develop them. To make matters worse, the services then overlay this 
process with their unique doctrine, and when services allude to missions 
they are almost always referring to their doctrinal missions, not to those of 
combatant commands. (Kuehl and Miller, 1994, p. 104) 
Another issue is that while the 1947 National Security Act addressed core warfare 
areas (air, land, sea), the world has changed. The way in which the Armed Forces 
respond to hostilities and crises have changed radically. Joint and multi-
national/coalition operations have become standard and there are new types of warfare 
which might require "a radical change in the way we think about service roles and 
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missions ... " (Kuehl and Miller, 104) These include space, electromagnetic spectrum, 
cyberspace-information warfare, and peace operations. Some have speculated that 
coming to grips with these arenas will be more disruptive than conventional debates 
about the overlap in functions. "A service with vision- and that is both intellectually and 
organizationally ready to grasp 'God's coattail' (as Otto von Bismarck quipped)- will be 
the best placed to be militarily dominant when the future is now." (Kuehl and Miller, 104) 
A word about the development of joint doctrine. There are several sources of 
authority for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish joint doctrine. Title 10 specifies that 
the Chairman is responsible for " ... developing doctrine for the joint employment of the 
armed forces." (10 USC 153.A. (5)) This is further reflected in DOD Directive 5100.1. 
Finally, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to give 
the Chairman responsibility of overseeing the activities of the combatant commands.· 
B. INTERFACES 
Success in joint warfare depends on mutual understanding and 
cooperation. Coherent joint doctrine is the catalyst for this essential 
cooperation between Services. Our naval doctrine must fully support and 
be a logical extension of joint doctrine. (NDP 1, 1994, p.25) 
Interfacing is not an easy task. Because of their roles and functions, the Services 
have a better understanding of their own capabilities and are in the best position to write 
doctrine on how to employ the forces they develop. At the same time, the Unified 
CINCs retain the corporate knowledge in warfighting and operations. Establishing 
Service doctrine thus requires close coordination between the Services and the CINCs to 
ensure that doctrine both ably reflects Service capabilities and supports the CINCs 
requirements. The Naval Doctrine Command recognizes the challenges presented by the 
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need to coordinate doctrine between the CINCs. The development of the Navy 
Expeditionary Force/Integrated Battle Organization is a good example.6 Despite the fact 
that the Integrated Battle Organization had been wargamed twice prior to being presented, 
senior naval leadership was unhappy for two reasons: 
• they were not a direct part of the development of the concept. 
• they did not feel they had been adequately briefed on the concept during its 
development, even though their staffs were aware of the changes. This may 
have been because they (the leaders) were focused more on real-world events 
rather than conceptual changes. 
Similarly, while CJCS is charged with developing doctrine for joint employment 
of forces, the CINCs have the expertise. The instability noted in Chapter II is present not 
only during joint operations, but on the staffs of the unified commands. Personnel from 
all Services must realign their thinking from their particular Service to the joint 
command, a difficult prospect. Control implies ownership, and unless care is taken, 
people often start protecting and defending own Service points of view rather than 
blending and uniting joint forces. There is a tendency even among CINC staffs to think 
in terms of own Service, not the CINC's joint forces. Often, true "joint-think" does not 
occur until the CINC-level. Although joint military education can help overcome this, 
integrated doctrine is needed to help stabilize these forces. 
6 The following discussion is based on a briefing presented by the Naval Doctrine Command's Director of Strategy and 
Concept Division on 2 February 1996 at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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Writing in 1951, Admiral Carney (then CINCSOUTH) addressed the challenges 
presented by joint operations. His point remains valid today. 
Working within the framework of one's own Service is a simple matter 
because the Service procedures have been long established and all of one's 
colleagues speak the same language and are guided by the same 
indoctrination. Joint efforts, be they on the staff or in the field, invariably 
require mutual adjustments; these adjustments may be radical but with 
people of good will and good spirit the Services can truly work as a team. 
(AFSC Pub 1, 1993, p. 2-43) 
Integrated doctrine is the tool that guides the team. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DOCTRINE 
Having defined doctrine, developed standards, and discussed some of the 
principal challenges facing doctrine developers, it is possible to relate the challenges to 
current doctrine. The Naval Doctrine Command began issuing Naval Doctrine 
Publications (NDPs) in 1993. The basic publications (NDP 1 through NDP 6) are 
considered capstone documents, intended to " ... articulate naval doctrine and provide the 
basis for the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures." (NDP 6, 1995, 
Foreword) All are intended to bridge the gap between the vision of From the Sea and the 
actions of the warfighter. The NDP series apply to all naval forces, that is, both the Navy 
and Marine Corps, as well as the U.S. Coast Guard when under the operational control of 
the Navy. 
Specific questions to be explored are: 
• Is the doctrine reflected inNDP 1 (Naval Warfare) and NDP 6 (Naval 
Command and Control) effective? 
• Does NDP 1 logically flow from higher sources, such as the National Military 
Strategy and Joint Pub 1? 
• Does NDP 6logically flow from higher sources, such as the National Military 
Strategy, Joint Pub 1, Joint Pub 6, and support NDP 1? 
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As discussed in Chapter II, one can distill the following standards for analyzing 
doctrine. 
• Compatibility. Does it flow from higher principles? Is it compatible with 
other doctrine at similar levels? Does it flow logically from higher and to lower 
levels? 
• Commonality. Does it unite action and promote a cohesive force? Does it 
offer a common perspective? 
• Beliefs. Is it' what people believe in and act on? 
• Training. Does it provide a training baseline and standard? 
• Guidance. Is it authoritative and firm? 
• Adaptability. Is the doctrine adaptable to the whole range of scenarios 
possible at its level? 
• Initiative. Does it allow initiative on the commander's part? 
• Control. Does it allow the commander to retain control? 
• Appropriateness. Does it know who the target audience is? Is it appropriate 
for this level? 
• Language. Is it simple, clear, and concise? 
• Ease of use. Is it easily understood and accomplished? 
A. JOINT DOCTRINE 
Joint Pubs 1 and 6 are part of six keystone publications. Written by the Joint 
Warfighting.Center, these publications are available through the World Wide Web (the 
Joint Electronic Library), on CD-ROM,.in a boxed set, and individually. The distribution 
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list for Joint Pub 1 is particularly noteworthy -- a copy is intended for each E-9 and each 
0-4 and above. Clearly, the Chairman intends for all Service members to become 
familiar with the joint publications, and Joint Pub 1 in particular. 
1. Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed 
Forces (Joint Pub 1) 
The purpose of Joint Pub 1 is to " ... guide the joint action of the Armed Forces of 
the United States, presenting concepts molding those Armed Forces into the most 
effective joint fighting force." (Joint Pub 1, 1993, p. iii) It does so very well. 
a. Strengths 
Joint Pub 1 is well crafted, a solid piece of basic doctrine. The basic tenet 
of Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare is Team Warfare," is reinforced throughout the document. 
Since future operations (running the gamut from humanitarian relief to war) will most 
likely involve both joint and multi-national/coalition teams, the U.S. Armed Forces must 
fight as a team and must institutionalize teamwork. It traces principles and fundamentals 
back to their sources (the Constitution, the National Military Strategy, and other joint 
doctrine publications). In so doing, it supports the higher principles guiding the Armed 
Forces and establishes a framework for subsequent doctrine. Joint Pub 1 clearly outlines 
core beliefs of the Armed Forces, both for individuals, units, and organizations. This is 
particularly true in Chapter I ("American Military Power) and Chapter II ("Values in Joint 
Warfare"). These chapters discuss the purpose ofthe U.S. Armed Forces, the nature of 
warfare, doctrine, and joint values7• 
7 Integrity, competence, physical and moral courage, and teamwork (Joint Pub l, 1991, pp. 7-14). 
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By discussing these principles and beliefs, common throughout the Armed 
Forces, Joint Pub 1 helps promote a cohesive force and unite joint teams. Joint Pub 1 
also acts as a companion to the basic doctrine publications of individual Services. When 
read together, they demonstrate the integration of the Service into the joint arena. 
Clearly intended for all members of the Armed Forces, the language is 
articulate and concise, precisely expressed yet easily understood by both senior officers 
and junior enlisted. The issues discussed are easy to understand, supported by 
numerous examples of joint operations through American history. The Afterword is 
particularly effective in illustrating the main points by showing how they were applied 
during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The doctrine found in Joint Pub 
1 is also relatively easy to accmnplish in that it sets no impossible tasks and discusses 
principles that have long been incorporated into the military psyche. As an example; 
Joint Pub 1 notes that, 
Defense of the national security rests first on the concept of 
deterrence ... .lf deterrence fails, then our single objective is winning the 
nation's wars. When we fight, we fight to win. (Joint Pub 1, 1991, p. 1) 
At the same time, however, it is important to realize that the actual process of carrying 
out the doctrine can be complex (consider, for example, fostering and maintaining unity 
of effort, a principle of war as applied to joint warfare). 
Joint Pub 1 clearly states that doctrine is authoritative, not directive (Joint 
Pub 1, p. 5) and recognizes that on each occasion, the commander must base decisions on 
the current circumstances. Initiative is encouraged throughout the publication (indeed, 
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initiative is noted as a principle of war). Because this is basic doctrine, it is adaptable 
enough to support the entire range of military operations. 
This publication establishes a training baseline across a wide range: as a 
basic introduction for recruits, to encourage junior personnel to start thinking beyond 
their immediate unit, and as an introduction to basic warfare principles. Further, it can be 
used to help educate the general public on what the Armed Forces are about. 
b. Drawbacks 
A drawback to Joint Pub 1 is that it does not discuss the elements that 
make each Service unique. In order to be integrated, team members must be aware of 
these differences. Joint Pub 1 is a logical place to present a broad overview of the 
Services' missions. A second drawback is that although the examples and graphics 
enhance the doctrine under discussion, they are ill-placed in the publication and disrupt 
the train of thought. Chapter IV ("The Joint Campaign") contains an overview of 
Operation OVERLORD which illustrates this problem. It discusses the unity of effort 
(and command), synergy, and synchronization of all forces that led to Allied successes at 
Normandy, in contrast to the " ... fragmented German command structure." (Joint Pub 1, 
p.50) A full page map clearly illustrates the joint campaign; several pictures showing 
General Eisenhower with members of air, sea, and ground units reinforce the joint team 
concept. Unfortunately, this overview takes up five pages in the middle ofthe chapter, 
disrupting the flow between the characteristics of the Joint Campaign and Supporting 
Capabilities. Extended examples might be better placed at the end of the chapter. A 
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much better placed example is the Afterword, which uses Operation DESERT 
SHIELD/DESERT STORM to illustrate virtually all the principles discussed. 
2. Joint Pub 6, Doctrine for Command, Control, 
Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to 
Joint Operations (Joint Pub 6) 
Joint Pub 6 establishes doctrine for command, control, communications, and 
computer (C) systems for joint operations and introduces responsibilities of the Services, 
agencies, and combatant commands. It outlines configuration and employment of these 
systems, as well. 
a. Strengths 
Joint Pub 6 echoes Joint Pub l's central theme ("Joint Warfare is Team 
Warfare") in its emphasis on interoperable systems that meet the warfighter's demand 
when needed. As with Joint Pub 1, the doctrine and principles in Joint Pub 6 can be 
traced back to higher principles, including the basic Roles and Missions statements, the 
National Military Strategy, and the vision and architecture outlined in C'Ijor the 
Warrior. Because the concepts in C'Ijor the Warrior are also reflected in the comparable 
Service statements (i.e., Copernicus (Navy), Enterprise (Army), and Horizon (Air 
Force)), there is a natural flow to the Service doctrine. Clearly, Joint Pub 6 contains 
doctrine both believed and acted upon. Joint Pub 6 further promotes unity of action by 
outlining system C4 objectives and principles for joint and multi-national operations, 
defining the basic components of C4 systems, and describing the communications 
organization of each of the Armed Forces (including the U.S. Coast Guard) and other 
DOD C4 agencies. 
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Because it is so specific regarding functions and principles of C4 systems, 
Joint Pub 6 provides a baseline and standard for what systems should be. The 
publication can also be used for training on basic C4 principles, and used as an 
introduction to how the other Services provide communications support (Marine Corps 
write-up is particularly good, covering all C41 areas). 
Although the tone of Joint Pub 6 is more direct and firm than that of Joint 
Pub 1, it remains authoritative guidance. While specifying mandatory C4 system 
capabilities and C4 principles that systems must meet, it also recognizes that there are 
unique circumstances which may demand trade-offs. The doctrine in Joint Pub 6 is 
expected to be followed except when the commander judges that " ... exceptional 
circumstances dictate otherwise." (Joint Pub 6, 1995, p. i) Because interoperable systems 
are so critical to successful operations, there is less room for adaptability in the doctrine 
(although flexible is one of the C4 principles). In fact, Joint Pub 6 specifies that systems 
must be designed to support warfare scenarios, yet recognizes that systems must ineet a 
wide range of operations in a changing environment. 
Written for both commanders and C4 professionals, Joint Pub 6 is equally 
appropriate for use by the Services, combatant commands, and DoD activities. 
Although possible to achieve, the doctrine will clearly be difficult to accomplish -- not 
through a fault of the doctrine, but because of the complexities of C4 technology and the 
rapid changes it is undergoing. Joint Pub 6 has the tone and feel of a Directive or 
Instruction. However, it is straightforward, and easy to understand with graphics, 
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photographs, and quotes to further illustrate the issues discussed. In addition, the 
Executive Summary provides a solid encapsulation of the critical points made by Joint 
Pub6. 
b. Drawbacks 
Interestingly, although Joint Pub 6 discusses the employment ofC4 
systems and their role in supporting command and control, it does not fully discuss 
command and control. An assumption is made that the reader understands these. 
Unfortunately, this is not always a valid assumption, particularly for junior C4 
professionals. The next edition of Joint Pub 6 could be strengthened by including a brief 
overview of command, control, and command and control. 
A minor drawback concerns the discussion of Service communications 
organizations and structures. It appears to have been edited from five separate inputs (the 
discussion includes the U.S. Coast Guard); the discussion is disjointed. The next edition 
of Joint Pub 6 could be strengthened by standardizing among the Services and integrating 
the discussion. The Marine Corps section is particularly effective, all inclusive, and 
could be used as a model section. 
B. NAVAL DOCTRINE 
Naval Doctrine Publications are considered capstone documents, applicable to the 
Navy and Marine Corps both, as well as the Coast Guard when operating as an arm of the 
Navy. Both NDP 1 and NDP 6 require that all naval professionals understand them. 
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1. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, (NDP 1) 
The first of the NDP series to be published, NDP 1 is intended to " ... provide a 
framework for detailed Navy and Marine Corps doctrine." (NDP 1, 1994, p. ii) 
Specifically, it provides a general introduction to the principles of naval warfare, the 
missions of naval forces, the capabilities they possess, and how these are accomplished. 
As the first Naval Doctrine Publication, NDP 1 represents a valiant effort to create 
a common doctrinal basis for the naval forces. Many of the fundamentals discussed in 
NDP 1 can be traced back to higher principles, such as the National Military Strategy, 
From the Sea, Title 10, and DOD Directive 5100.1. Like Joint Pub 1 and other Services' 
basic doctrine publications, it attempts to establish the core beliefs and values8 of the 
naval forces, as well as describe those characteristics which are unique to the naval 
forces. NDP 1 emphasizes naval teamwork and the Navy-Marine Corps team throughout. 
Because it is basic doctrine, NDP 1 is adaptable to the wide range of operations 
the naval forces are involved in. In that initiative is a stated desire of naval doctrine, 
NDP 1 encourages and allows initiative. 
NDP l could serve as a training resource, particularly the discussions on doctrine 
and power projection, and to a lesser extent, principles of war, maneuver warfare, and 
employment of naval forces. It is important to note, though, that NDP 1 merely provides 
an overview of these issues. It does not intend to achieve the depth of knowledge gained 
through professional military education, but serves admirably as a guide for further study. 
8 When NDP 1 was issued in 1994, the Navy and Marine Corps had different core values; consequently, NDP 1 reflects 
the core values of Joint Pub 1. Since then, the Navy has adopted the Marine Corps values of honor, courage, and 
commitment. 
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Except for Chapter One, NDP 1 is written in straightforward language at a basic 
level. Chapter One, however, tends to ramble. The examples and photos support the 
text, although very few of them reflect littoral warfare. 
NDP 1 had to be staffed through both the Marine Corps and Navy organizations. 
In so doing, it probably weakened what might otherwise have been strong points. Each of 
the naval forces has unique qualities, which are not discussed in NDP 1. Consequently, 
NDP 1 falters by seeking the middle ground. 
NDP 1 contains two major flaws that weaken its intent and the doctrine it 
contains: the authors appear to have had a difficult time determining the target 
audience, and so the tone of the publication is weak and rambling. Because of this, 
some of the critical issues regarding doctrine suffer. The foreword requires that all "naval 
professionals" understand NDP 1, yet this begs the question: who is considered a navcil 
professional? What about the many junior people who may not consider themselves 
naval professionals yet have a vested interest in the publications? 
NDP 1 attempts to provide a common point of view for naval forces. It discusses 
the need for and genesis of U.S. naval forces and the character of those forces, as well as 
their employment, the naval forces' position on doctrine, and naval principles of war. 
These are essential to basic doctrine and helps to provide a focus for naval forces. 
Although NDP 1 contains beliefs and core values of the naval forces, they are 
difficult to discern. It would be more effective to boldly highlight them, rather than 
submerge them in the text with a discussion. This is particularly true of Chapter One, 
which would be an ideal place to discourse on shared core values. 
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Although it does discuss the items promised in its purpose~ NDP 1 contains little 
doctrine9 and does not fully live up to its promise to provide a framework. The 
following discussion explains why. 
NDP 1 has been described as both a capstone a cornerstone of Naval Doctrine. 
Unfortunately, these are opposing terms and symbolic of some of the difficulties with 
both naval doctrine in general, and NDP 1 in particular. A capstone is a "crowning 
' achievement;" a cornerstone is a "basic element" (Merriam Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary, 1993, pp. 170, 258) A capstone cannot be set in place until the rest of the 
structure is in place. A cornerstone is one of the first stones laid. In much the same 
manner, NDP 1 (indeed, the entire series) cannot truly cap a system with elements 
(subordinate doctrine, Naval Warfare Publications, etc:) that change to meet the evolving 
needs of the organization being supported. Instead, NDP 1 might best serve as a 
foundation -- a cornerstone -- from which to build the remaining publications in the 
series. 
In summary, NDP 1 does not fully meet its intent to " ... provide a framework for 
detailed Navy and Marine Corps doctrine." (NDP 1, 1994, p. ii) The following 
weaknesses need to be overcome for it to be an effective document: 
• there is very little doctrine is contained in NDP 1. 
• it does not settle on a specific target audience or purpose, and thus misses all of 
them. 
9 
According to one former Naval Doctrine Staff member, Dr. J.J. Tritten, NDP l makes substantive doctrinal statements 
about three subjects: maneuver warfare, offensive, ,and task organized operations. In addition, NDP 1 notes the core 
contemporary mission of power projection and establishes the operational level of war, perhaps for the first time in 
Navy doctrine. 
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• NDP 1 does not seem to flow from and interface with Joint Pub 1 --it tends to 
stand alone, rather than expound on how the Navy incorporates the doctrine 
addressed in Joint Pub 1. This may be due, in part, to the fact that Joint Pub 1 
is intended for joint warfare and CJCS has stated there is no intent to interfere 
with Service core skills (which NDP 1 hopes to help guide) .. Still, this seems 
an inSufficient justification for the lack of strong ties to Joint Pub 1. 
• NDP 1 needs to include more recent examples of the principles being 
. illustrated, particularly as the National Military Strategy has changed 
dramatically over the past five years. 
• it is hard to discern the framework established by NDP 1. As a result, the other 
doctrine publications currently published (and being drafted) are not fully 
integrated with NDP 1. 
Specific recommendations for strengthening NDP 1 are found in Chapter V. 
2. Naval Doctrine Publication 6, Naval Command and Control 
(NDP 6) 
NDP 6 " ... discusses the philosophical foundation of command and control, how 
commanders monitor and influence operations, the command and control process, the 
systems through which command and control is executed, and the various ways in which 
commanders establish effective command and control." (NDP 6, 1995, p. ii) It does not 
refer to any other aspect of C4I. Like NDP 1, it is considered a capstone document to 
articulate naval doctrine. 
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a. Strengths 
NDP 6 is a strong, well-crafted document. It provides a sound primer on 
naval command and control, as well as a brief discussion of the characteristics of naval 
C4I systems, and what makes effective command and control. In so doing, it reflects 
many of the fundamentals and principles found in higher and same level doctrine, such 
as Clfor the Warrior, Joint Pubs 1 and 6, and (maybe) NDP 1. 
NDP 6 successfully establishes the "philosophical foundation of command 
and control," providing a foundation upon which naval forces can build C4I doctrine. It 
contains some authoritative guidance in identifying such things as characteristics of C4I 
systems and information criteria, although this is not the prime focus of the publication. 
NDP 6 is a versatile document. It can be a valuable training resource for 
school house use, and as a basis for wardroom discussions. In echoing the characteristics 
of C4I systems and fundamentals of effective command and control, it provides baselines 
for measuring naval C4I systems. It will be particularly effective when used as a 
companion piece to Joint Pub 6. 
It is flexible enough to use as a basic command and control doctrine 
publication throughout the Department of Defense. It can be used throughout the chain of 
command and adapted to meet virtually any leadership level, although the basic focus is 
on the combatant commander. Noting that initiative is at the core of naval warfare, it 
encourages development of initiative among subordinate commanders. 
Well written, NDP 6 is easily understood, clearly and concisely 
summarizing an intricate topic. The examples provided enhance the text. The best of 
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these, an analogy comparing command and control to the human body's central nervous 
system, clearly indicates that NDP 6 is intended for leaders at all levels. As with Joint 
Pub 6, however, achieving effective command and control is a complicated task. 
b. Drawbacks 
Although a solid document on command and control, NDP 6 does not 
discuss C41, leaving that to Joint Pub 6. As a result, it addresses philosophy and theory 
more appropriate for Joint Publications than for Service-unique issues. 
In a speech to AFCEA in 1995, the Chief of Naval Operations noted that 
the Copernicus architecture, introduced in 1990, " .. .is an initiative to make C41 systems 
responsive to the warfighter, field them quickly, capitalize on advances in technology, 
and shape doctrine to reflect changes." Admiral Boorda noted that the Navy had led the 
way in this initiative: the Joint Staff issued CI for the Warrior in 1992, based on 
Copernicus; the Army followed in 1993 with its Enterprise Strategy; and the Air Force 
in 1994 with Horizon. NDP 6 does not appear to reflect Copernicus. 
Specific recommendations for strengthening NDP 6 are found in 
ChapterV. 
C. OTHER SERVICE BASIC DOCTRINE 
It is a given that naval forces will no longer act alone, but instead will be an 
integral part of a joint team. All the Armed Forces exist to support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States. To better interface with them, it is imperative for naval 
forces to be familiar with other Service core doctrine and understand the unique qualities 
of each Service. Further, it is important to be aware of any major disconnect between 
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Service doctrines. This section briefly reviews the basic doctrine publications of the 
Marine Corps (FMFM 1), Army (FM 100-5), and Air Force (Draft AFDD 1). 
1. Fleet Marine Force Manuall, Warfighting (FMFM 1) 
A more coherent document than NDP 1, FMFM 1 describes Marine Corps 
doctrine and the Commandant's philosophy on warfare. It 
... provides the authoritative basis for how we [the Marine Corps] fight and 
how we prepare to fight.. .. [T]his book ... provides broad guidance in the 
form of concepts and values. It requires judgment in application .... This 
manual thus describes a philosophy for action which, in war and in peace, 
in the field and in the rear, dictates our approach to duty. 
(FMFM 1, Foreword) 
The manual shows a clear progression from the definition of war and its nature 
through the theory of war to preparing for war and conducting it. Intended for all Marine 
officers, the publication is broad enough to be of value throughout the Armed Forces~ it 
remains viable today, despite the fact that it was published in 1989. 
2. Field Manuall00-5, Operations 
Chapter One of this, the Army's most important doctrinal publication, provides 
good definitions -- up front -- of doctrine's role. It touches on the conditions under 
which the Army will operate: regional challenges, adversaries with fundamentally 
different belief systems, ambiguity and uncertainty~ in short, anywhere in the world over 
the " ... full range of possible operations as part of a joint and combined team." (FM 100-5, 
1993) 
"This keystone manual links Army roles and missions to the National Military 
Strategy, of which power projection is a fundamental principle .... The Army recognizes 
that it will normally operate in combination with air, naval, and space assets to achieve 
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the overall strategic aim of decisive land combat. It also recognizes that operations 
outside the United States will usually be in conjunction with allies." (FM 100-5, 1993, 
Preface) 
3. Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Basic Doctrine (Draft) 
(AFDDl) 
. . 
AFDD 1 provides a solid overview of the Air Force's fundamental principles for 
.. 
every airman. It is equally a publication that will be valuable to personnel from other 
Services who are operating with the Air Force. Rather than focus on warfighting, it 
focuses on the basics that must be understood and internalized by all Air Force personnel 
in order to support and conduct the Air Force's warfighting. It lays out the characteristics 
of aerospace power, highlights core competencies of the Air Force, and clearly defines 
"war" and how the Air Force applies principles of war. AFDD 1 will be an ideal 




In the execution of good doctrine there is always tension between 
conformity and initiative .... To a man, strong military leaders want freedom 
for initiative from their seniors and reliability from their juniors. Doctrine 
in the hands of able commanders will, at its most sublime, allow them 
achievement of both these things. (Hughes, 1986, p. 29) 
The U.S. Navy has only recently begun to respond to the need for strong, 
utilitarian doctrine. Although the Naval Doctrine Command has been writing and issuing 
doctrine for several years, there is not yet a doctrinally attuned culture or structure in the 
U.S. Navy. For Naval doctrine to be effective, it must be cohesive and well-interfaced 
with joint doctrine. Currently, it does not appear to be so. 
Although there are ties to higher-level sources such as the National Military 
Strategy and From the Sea, the ties between NDP 1 and NDP 6 appear to be weaker; they 
do not yet serve as an integrated overview. Both of these publications have the potential 
. . 
to become strong doctrinal statements for the naval forces. The following section 
provides some recommendations for strengthening them. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. NDP 1 
As the first of the capstone documents; NDP 1 appears to be a place holder, issued 
to "get something on the streets" while more challenging doctrine publications (for 
example, NDP 3 Operations) are developed and issued. The next edition will be stronger 
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I 
for the experience the Naval Doctrine Command has gained over the past three years. 
The following recommendations are offered to further strengthen NDP 1. 
• Because formal doctrine is still a relatively new concept for the Navy, highlight 
the basic discussion on doctrine. Currently, it is part of Chapter Three's 
section on "Preparing for War." While clearly part of the preparations of war 
(doctrine must be well established and practiced prior to crisis for it to be 
effective), the topic is important enough to the naval forces that it deserves to 
be brought to the forefront. 
• Chapter Four is mistitled. The title, "Where We are Headed - Into the 21st 
Century" implies a vision and brings to mind Vision 2010, yet it discusses the 
present and builds on ·From the Sea's discussion of "Operational Capabilities." 
• Require ''all naval personnel" to become familiar with NDP 1. The term · 
"naval professionals" is open to interpretation. Some will consider all naval 
personnel to be professional, while others may only consider careerists to be 
the professionals. The fundamentals presented in NDP 1 are applicable to all 
naval personnel, regardless of their category. 
• Chapter One might further reinforce the discussion of what constitutes "naval 
forces" (currently buried as a footnote). In addition, there should be an 
acknowledgment of the unique capabilities and missions of the individual 
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naval Services (that is, what makes the Navy unique and distinct from the 
Marine Corps and Coast Guard). Along with this: 
•• strengthen the discussion of core values and core beliefs. The Navy 
and Marine Corps now share core values of honor, courage, 
commitment; NDP 1 should reflect these. 
•• consider a more even mix of photographs of naval forces. The 
majority of pictures support "Navy" warfare. Including additional 
pictures of the Marine Corps (and Coast Guard) will further 
reinforce the naval team. 
• Clearly outline the legal foundation for the naval forces' roles, missions, and 
functions. These are currently addressed in NDP 1 as a footnote, but deserve 
more discussion, particularly as this discussion is missing from Joint Pub 1. 
• Restructure NDP 1 as a "Basic Doctrine" publication to serve as the 
cornerstone to support the remaining doctrine publications. 
• It has been four years since From the Sea was first published. NDP 1 needs to 
broaden its discussion of littoral warfare. In addition, some of the examples in 
NDP 1 should illustrate littoral warfare. If specific U.S. examples are not 
available, it might be possible to pull examples from other recent conflicts 
(Israeli experiences and the British experiences in the Falklands come most 
readily to mind). 
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2. NDP6 
NDP 6 provides an excellent foundation for Command and Control, but scarcely 
addresses Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I). 
Specific recommendations for further development follow. 
• Expand Chapter Three to include a discussion on how naval forces will employ 
C4I systems. Joint Pub 6 can be used as a model. 
• Use NDP 6 to bridge the gap between the vision of the Copernicus 
Architecture and the employment of C4I systems. 
3. Other Recommendations 
Other recommendations include the following. 
• As noted earlier, some critical fundamentals are submerged in the text of both 
NDP 1 and NDP 6. Develop "one-liners" that reinforce the significant points, 
as Joint Pub 1 does ("Joint Warfare is Team Warfare" and "In all multinational 
endeavors, the teamwork of the US Armed Forces should set a strong example" 
are two examples pulled at random from Joint Pub 1). 
• Recognize that building a Navy-Marine Corps team also includes capitalizing 
on the strengths of the individual team members. In the case of naval doctrine, 
this means recognizing unique Service capabilities as part of the doctrinal 
statement, rather than reaching for the common elements the naval services 
share. This is not to say that the common elements should be eliminated. At 
the same time, it is important to recognize the synergy resulting from these two 
Services working closely together. Although NDP 1 and NDP 6 refer to the 
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Navy-Marine Corps team, there is no discussion of the powerful impact this 
can have. For example, the Guadalcanal campaign is famous for the 
integration of land, sea, and especially naval air forces. The Navy positioned 
Marines at the center of gravity; the Marines protected Henderson Field, the 
critical node. Land and sea-based air forces collaborated to achieve battlespace 
dominance in the eastern Solomons 10. 
• Develop a higher profile for both the Naval Doctrine Command and its 
products. This could be modeled after the Joint Warfighting Center's 
ambitious plan to market the Joint Ptibli.cations. This will also help develop 
the doctrinally-attuned culture in the U.S. Navy. As an interim measure, this 
might include things such as: 
•• publishing articles dealing with current and planned doctrine 
publications, and papers regarding related issues in a variety of 
periodicals. 
•• establishing a homepage on the World Wide Web. By putting 
publications on-line, the Naval Doctrine Command could reach a 
wider distribution of publications and papers and help strengthen the 
doctrinal culture 11 • 
10 
A noted earlier, Joint Pub 1 discusses synergy in Chapter IV ('The Joint Campaign) and offers Operation 
OVERLORD as an example. Joint Pub 1 also refers to "Joint Campaigning in the Solomons, 1942-1943," as an 
example of agility, a principle of Joint Warfare. (Joint Pub 1, 1991, pp. 23-29) 
11 
The basic NDPs are currently available on-line through the Joint Warfighting Center's Joint Electronic Library. This 
is a step in the right direction. 
45 
C. TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Naval doctrine is a broad area with many topics for additional research. The 
following lists topics related to basic doctrine. For topics related to doctrine at the 
tactical level, readers may wish to consult "Navy Tactics, Doctrine, and Training 
Requirements for Littoral Warfare," a Naval Postgraduate School thesis by LT John 
Wade. 
• Explore how the capstone series of Naval Doctrine Publications can be 
integrated with subordinate level doctrine and publications. For example; 
Naval Telecommunications Publications should logically be part of a chain that 
starts with NDP 6. 
• Develop new and current examples for Naval Doctrine Publications. Although 
the examples used support the text, for the most part they continue to reflect 
the Maritime Strategy, not the littoral strategy of From the Sea. Operation 
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM can provide some examples. It may be 
necessary to look to other nations, as well. The British experience in the 
Falklands and the Israeli experiences in general may be starting places. 
• Review Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard doctrine for compatibility and 
disconnects, as these are the Armed Forces specifically covered by Naval 
Doctrine Publications. 
• Explore Naval Doctrine Command's role with regards to training. One author 
has suggested that there is a lack of training doctrine which crosses all Navy 
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communities. He suggested NDP 7, Naval Readiness Training, which he 
envisioned as 
an umbrella doctrinal philosophy needs to be developed to 
define what we really mean by 'train like you fight.' .... This 
Service-wide doctrine should come from the same organization 
that sets war-fighting doctrine, i.e., the Naval Doctrine 
Command. If assigned to the Chief of Naval Education and 
Training, warfare and training doctrine will be written in 
separate environments. That hardly lends itself to training like 
we fight.. .. The vehicle for a training doctrine already exists 
within the Naval Doctrine Command. (Oliver, 1995, p. 42) 
• Review FMFM 1. Although the publication remains viable today, it was 
published in 1989. It may need updating in light of the changes brought about 
by From the Sea. 
• Review Service doctrine on C2 and C4I (NDP 6's counterparts) to ensure they 
are compatible. It is as critical for this doctrine to be interoperable as it is for 
the systems. 
There may be a perception in the Fleet that a tour at the Naval Doctrine Command 
is not particularly career enhancing12• In order for this command to produce the highest 
quality products, it must attract the best officers in the naval forces, and they must see 
their tour as offering a bright future. 
12 During a discussion of"Navy Tactics in Small Worlds" at the AFCEA West Conference on 24 January 1996, one 
panel member specifically stated his concern that sending "good people" to Naval Doctrine Command would harm, 
or at best stall, their careers. 
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ON-LINE RESOURCES 
The following URL addresses are current as of 15 June 1996. 
U.S. Army 
1. Command and General Staff College: 
a. Corps and Division Doctrine Directorate Library contains approved and draft 
doctrine; white papers; and doctrine notes. 
ht.://www-cgsc.army .miVcgsc/cddlcdd.htm 
b. Military Review 
http://www-cgsc.army.miVcgsc/milrev/milrev.htm 
2. Training and Doctrine Command's home page provides links to TRADOC 
publications and other homepages. 
http://www-tradoc.army.mil 
a. TRADOC publications 
http:/1155.217 .20.99/atdls.html 
b. FM 100-5, Operations 
bttp://155.217 .20.55/ ATDLIDOCS/fm/100-5/100-5toc.htm 
3. FORCE XXI homepage. 
h ttp://204. 7.227.67: 1100/force21/f21home.html 
U.S.Nayy 
1. The Navy Public Affairs Library Index provides links to a variety of documents. 
http://www.navy.miVnavpalib/. www/subject.html 
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Joint Warfighting Center 
1. Joint Doctrine Homepage 
http://www .dtic.miVdoctrine/index.html 
The Joint Doctrine Homepage also provides links to the Joint Pubs Homepage, which 
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